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Abstract 
Special Purpose Districts in Texas: The Case for Municipal Utility 
Districts 
Corey Grafton Howell, MBA/MPAff 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
Supervisor:  Michael Granof 
Texas is one of the fastest growing states in the nation. As the population continues 
to increase, so does the demand for public utilities, especially in urban and suburban areas. 
Furthermore, an increasing population means additional strains on the existing urban and 
suburban utility infrastructure. These public utilities include water, sewer, drainage, roads, 
levees, and their related infrastructure. 
To accommodate the needs of a growing population, certain urban areas of Texas 
have utilized special purpose districts to finance, construct, and operate the public 
infrastructure in new and growing communities. The use of special purpose districts has 
been more heavily used in some urban areas, such as Houston, than others. 
This report will consider why the special district model in Texas has been generally 
successful with respect to issuing debt for the construction, maintenance, development, and 
operation of public utilities and other capital projects. Additionally, to highlight some of 
the potential risks this report will look at a case in which a special purpose district has 
defaulted on outstanding debt obligations. 
 v 
The research points will be addressed by discussing the history of special purpose 
districts in Texas, as well as their statutory and regulatory frameworks, including their 
powers, composition, means of and reasons for creation, and authorities. The report will 
also describe the various types of special purpose districts in Texas and their powers. 
Additionally, the report will discuss the various debt instruments available to a special 
purpose district in Texas, how the debt of a special purpose district can be structured and 
issued, and key variables of a special purpose district’s financial makeup, such as the 
district’s assessed valuation and the various revenue-generating and cost centers of a 
district. 
The report will then argue how and why the special district model in Texas has been 
largely successful. Next, the report will use a case to highlight failures in the special district 
model and describe changes in law and regulation that have been made to respond to these 
failures, as well as reactions from the capital markets. 
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Chapter 1: Background 
 Municipal Utility Districts (MUDs) are local government entities, specifically, 
political subdivisions of the State of Texas that are created by land developers to finance 
the water, sewer, and drainage systems required for their urban or suburban commercial, 
residential, or mixed use development projects. MUDs are governed by a board of 
directors who are elected by the tax/rate payers within the MUD’s jurisdiction. Although 
developers creates the MUD from a legal standpoint, they are not in control of the 
governing functions of the MUD, a duty which is solely left to the members of the board 
of directors. 
MUDs have the authority to issue tax-exempt municipal bonds, which allows 
them to borrow funds for non-land inputs at lower interest costs than the developers 
would be able to finance the funds in private capital markets. The following sections will 
provide details on the history of special districts in Texas, the structure and creation of 
MUDs, their powers and authorities, and other background information relating to 
MUDs. 
History of Special Districts 
 Growth in urban and suburban populations requires the development of new 
residential communities and commercial establishments to service the needs of those 
communities. Major capital outlays must be made in order to provide quality water, 
sewer, drainage, and other public services to these communities.1 General units of 
                                                 
1 Joe B. Allen and David M. Oliver, Jr., “Municipal Utility Districts in Texas” (report, Houston, Texas, 
2014), 1. 
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government, such as states, counties, cities, have sometimes been unwilling or unable to 
finance these large capital outlays. In Texas, this inability has been due to legal 
restrictions in the Constitution on municipal debt and taxing authority, combined with the 
unwillingness of one constituency to incur debt for the benefit of another, especially 
when risks associated with new development are involved.2 
 Private financing of these capital outlays for public utilities was previously 
attempted, but the concept failed. In large part, this was attributable to the fact that 
infrastructure costs were recovered through the sale of land and ultimately passed down 
to the homebuyer. This resulted in higher lot prices and unaffordable housing. Private 
financing also comes with higher borrowing costs for the developer as opposed to the 
much lower borrowing costs that MUDs enjoy due to the full faith and credit of their 
unlimited tax pledge to service any incurred debt. Furthermore, private ownership of the 
facilities was attempted, which led to the construction of substandard systems. 
Additionally, this model led to excessive fees and rates, which were required to recover 
capital costs.3  
 States like Texas, Florida, and California that have realized rapid population 
growth have addressed these shortcoming by using special district governments to 
finance all or part of the required utility and community support facilities. These special 
districts are local government entities that can be granted with special powers to provide 
one or more specific services when general purpose governments cannot or will not 
provide necessary service to an area. This flexibility makes special districts efficient tools 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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for the stimulation of urban growth and enables them to function in the development of 
commercial, industrial, and residential properties, as well as in projects ranging in scope 
from small subdivisions to large master-planned communities.4 
 Texas recognized the need for special districts as early as 1904 when the 
Legislature, through voter approval, adopted Article III, Section 52, of the Texas 
Constitution, which authorized the Texas Legislature to pass laws creating special water 
districts.5 After struggling with limits on indebtedness and other shortcomings in the 
1904 amendment, the Legislature, again through voter approval, adopted Article XVI, 
Section 59, of the Texas Constitution in 1917, which allowed water districts to operate 
with unlimited tax authority and bond indebtedness.6 
 Initially, these water districts were used to develop water irrigation systems for 
agriculture lands and later to service small rural communities. Once the use of water 
districts increased substantially in the 1950s and 1960s, the Legislature adopted Chapter 
54 of the Texas Water Code in 1971, which authorized the creation of MUDs to 
streamline the process by which they were established and created. In 1995, Chapter 49 
was added to standardize the administrative provisions for the numerous types of 
districts.7 Today, MUDs are the primary financing tool used by developers in Texas for 
new development projects.8 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 2. 
5 Tex. Const. Article III. Sec. 52. 
6 Tex. Const. Article XVI. Sec. 59. 
7 See Appendix 1 for a list of the types of special districts in Texas. 
8 See Appendix 2 for a legislative timeline relating to special districts. 
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City Involvement and Today’s Special Districts in Texas 
 Municipalities in Texas are endowed with a sphere of influence outside of their 
boundaries known as extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ). A city must consent to the 
creation of a MUD within its ETJ or its corporate limits. In its consent, the city may 
require the MUD to submit all plans or its infrastructure for approval and limit the length 
of maturity and interest rate of the MUD bonds.9 The city bears no risk for the 
development of the MUD, while controlling the quality of the infrastructure. The city has 
the legal option to annex the MUD, acquire all the assets and assume the debt, subject to 
certain procedural steps.10 However, it is important to note that it is fairly uncommon for 
cities, specifically the City of Houston, to annex a MUD, especially those that the city has 
approved within its ETJ. The reasons for this are partly political and partly financial. That 
is, the city typically does not want to include much more conservative voters in its 
elections and the city does not want to assume the debt and operating functions of a 
MUD’s utilities. 
 A majority of the approximately 1,100 special districts in Texas today were 
created over vacant land owned by the developer outside of city limits. Even after 
significant annexation by cities, over 2 million people populate these special districts, and 
it is estimated that there is in excess of $6.5 billion in outstanding special district bonds.11 
There has been significant use of special districts in Austin and an increasing usage in the 
Dallas area. However, most of the special districts in Texas are located in the Houston 
                                                 
9 Association of Water Board Directors, “Water District Directors’ Handbook” (report, Spring, Texas, 
2014), 17. 
10 Allen and Oliver, “Municipal Utility Districts in Texas”, 2. 
11 Ibid. 
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metropolitan area with an estimated 600 special districts. To put this into perspective, 
over the past thirty years all of the major community developments in the Houston 
metropolitan area have been developed using special districts. The phenomenon is 
attributable to the differences between the local government’s policies on land 
development, especially in suburban areas, versus that of other major cities. 
Creation of MUDs 
 MUDs are created by using one of two methods, general law districts or special 
law districts. Through general law, a district may be created by the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) or the local county commissioners’ court. A general law 
district conforms to, and is established under, a particular enabling statute in the Texas 
Water Code.12 Types of general law districts include: MUDs, water control and 
improvement districts, levee improvement districts, fresh water supply districts, water 
improvement districts, irrigation districts, drainage districts, navigation districts, 
groundwater conservation districts, municipal management districts, and storm water 
control districts. Most general law districts begin with a petition by a specific number of 
landowners in the proposed district. The petition is presented before a county 
commissioners’ court or the TCEQ and, if approved at that level, its creation is 
determined by a vote in the proposed district. 
 Special law districts have been either created by or altered by an act of the 
Legislature. The Legislature has passed numerous separate statutes creating special law 
districts which may perform one function or a limited purpose. However, special law 
                                                 
12 Association of Water Board Directors, “Water District Directors’ Handbook”, 17. 
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districts often combine several of the functions performed by some of the general law 
districts. General law districts may include geographical areas that differ from district 
areas defined in the various general laws or emphasize a different function. Although 
special law districts bear names such as water district, water supply district, or others, it 
should be noted that a district’s name does not necessarily reveal its legal origin or the 
scope of its activities.13 
Whether a district is created through general or special law depends on how the 
developer opts to create the district. There are no requirements on which option must be 
selected in terms of how a district is created. Most districts are created through special 
law out of procedural preference and given the fact that special law districts can be 
granted additional powers through their statutory creation despite the type of district that 
it is called. 
District Consultants 
 The board of directors of a district have broad powers and extensive 
responsibilities. However, board members receive nominal compensation (typically a per 
diem) from the district and serve part-time. Moreover, board members may not have the 
training and expertise to perform the duties and professional services that a MUD 
requires. Although most MUDs do not have employees, the MUDs may contract with a 
variety of consultants in order to carry out the functions of the district, all of which 
require technical expertise. Below is a list of the primary consultants and a brief 
description of their duties for a typical MUD. 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
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1. Bond Counsel: The attorney for the district serves as its general counsel 
and, as such, handles all legal work associated with the creation and 
operations of the district, elections, filings, notices, and bond issuance.14 
The bond counsel issues certain opinions related to the district and its debt 
whenever a new series of bonds are issued. Bond counsel also keeps the 
official record of all board meetings and prepares all documents related to 
meetings, such as resolutions, agendas, and minutes. 
2. Financial Advisor: The financial advisor helps a district structure its bond 
deals, market the district’s bonds during an issuance, and prepare all bond 
sale documents and credit packages.15 The financial advisor also assists in 
managing everyday financial operations, such as tax rate setting, 
reviewing utility service rates, and preparing other informational reports as 
requested by the board of directors. 
3. Engineer: The engineer prepares the final designs and specifications for 
the development project and ensures that the developer, builders, and all 
contractors follow development plans and specifications.16 Engineers also 
ensure all district infrastructure meets TCEQ standards and determines 
when facilities need to be expanded.  
                                                 
14 Ibid., 85. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 84. 
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4. Operator: The district’s service operator serves the same function as a 
city’s water and wastewater department. The operator handles everyday 
issues that residents have with their water services and bills. 
5. Bookkeeper: The bookkeeper is responsible for maintaining cash receipts 
and disbursements, including bond payments authorized by the board.17 
Therefore, the bookkeeper is also responsible for maintaining detailed 
financial records on behalf of the district. 
6. Auditor: The auditor, who is a Certified Public Accountant, conducts all 
annual auditing per state rules and regulations. The auditor advises the 
board on improvements to be made to its accounting system and areas of 
noncompliance with statutes, regulations, and contractual obligations.18 
7. Tax-Assessor Collector: The tax-assessor collector is appointed by the 
board to handle the assessment and collection of taxes within the district. 
The tax-assessor collector coordinates with the chief appraiser of the 
central appraisal district for the county in which the district is found.19 
Bond Issuance Process 
 After its creation, a MUD holds a confirmation election where the registered 
voters in the MUD approve the creation of the MUD, authorize the MUD to issue a 
sufficient amount of municipal bonds required to complete all of the anticipated 
development in the district, and elect the initial board of directors for the MUD. It is 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 85. 
19 Ibid., 86. 
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important to note that voters authorize the MUD to issue bonds for certain purposes (e.g. 
water, sewer, drainage, park, etc.) and up to a certain amount. The MUD can continue to 
issue bonds that are “authorized but unexpended” until it reaches the debt ceiling set by 
the voters. 
 MUDs are reimbursement vehicles and, thus, do not generate capital on the front 
end to pay for development projects. MUDs rely on funds advanced by developers to pay 
for construction of its water, sewer, and drainage facilities. The MUD and the developer 
enter into a development financing agreement in which the developer agrees to advance 
funds to the MUD to pay for the construction of utilities as engineering and construction 
invoices come due and the MUD agrees to reimburse the developer for funds advanced if 
and when the MUD has the ability to do so.20 
The funds used to reimburse the developer for the construction of the MUD’s 
public facilities are obtained through the capital markets, specifically, through the sale of 
tax-exempt municipal bonds. The MUD makes debt service payments on the bonds 
through its power to levy and collect ad valorem taxes (unlimited as to rate) on all taxable 
property in the MUD. The taxes are paid by the homeowners and landowners in the 
MUD. Additionally, the homeowners and other users pay monthly water and sewer fees 
to cover the costs of operating and maintaining the system. 
                                                 
20 Allen and Oliver, “Municipal Utility Districts in Texas”, 6. 
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Types of Debt Instruments Available to MUDs 
 In general, MUDs typically issue debt that is structured in one of several ways. 
The primary debt instruments that MUDs issue are general obligation bonds, revenue 
bonds, refunding bonds, and bond anticipation notes. 
 General obligation bonds refers to a bond that is payable from general funds of 
the issuer, although the precise source and priority of payment for general obligation 
bonds may vary considerably from issuer to issuer depending on applicable state or local 
law.21 Most general obligation bonds are said to entail the full faith and credit, and in 
many cases, such as MUDs, the taxing power of the issuer. General obligation bonds 
issued by MUDs often are payable from the district’s ad valorem taxes. MUDs must 
receive voter approval to issue up to a certain amount of debt. General obligation bonds 
count towards the amount approved by voters in the district. According to the Municipal 
Advisory Council of Texas, all special districts and authorities in Texas currently have 
outstanding general obligation debt that amounts to about $39 billion.22 It is important to 
note that this figure captures districts that are outside the scope of this report, such as 
navigation districts, port authorities, river authorities, and other special districts. 
 Revenue bonds refer to a bond that is payable from a specific source of revenue. 
Pledged revenues may be derived from operations of the district or the financed project or 
                                                 
21 “Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms,” Municipal Securities Rule Making Board, accessed March 
23, 2016, http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/GENERAL-OBLIGATION-BOND-OR-GO-
BOND.aspx. 
22 “Top Issuers by Outstanding Debt,” Municipal Advisory Council of Texas, accessed April 13, 2016, 
https://www.mactexas.com/Issuers/IssuerSearch/TopOutstanding?IssuerType=1. 
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other specified non-ad-valorem taxes.23 Revenue bonds differ from general obligation 
bonds because no voter approval is required prior to issuance. 
 MUDs typically issue refunding bonds once a previously issued series of bonds 
become callable, but only if the district will realize enough in present value savings to 
warrant the new issue. The MUD then exercises the call provision on the outstanding 
bonds, if one exists, and issues the refunding package at a lower interest rate. The 
proceeds of the new bonds are either deposited in escrow to pay the debt service on the 
outstanding bonds when due in an “advance refunding” or used to promptly (typically 
within 90 days) retire the outstanding bonds in a “current refunding.”24 
 Bond anticipation notes are short term obligations that are used as instruments for 
developer reimbursement and are paid off with the proceeds of a subsequent bond issue. 
Bond anticipation notes typically have a maturity that does not exceed one year. 
Bond Rating 
 MUDs are issued credit ratings by the credit rating agencies in order to designate 
the quality of the district’s debt that it is issuing as compared with other municipal bonds 
sold and traded on the market. It is important to note that not all MUDs are rated districts, 
especially those that are in the early stages (i.e. newly created districts with not enough 
assessed valuation on the ground in order to warrant obtaining a credit rating). These 
designations rank the bonds on a scale according to what the credit rating agencies deem 
is their credit worthiness. In their most recent criteria publication, Standard & Poor’s 
                                                 
23 “Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms,” Municipal Securities Rule Making Board, accessed March 
23, 2016, http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/REVENUE-BOND.aspx. 
24 “Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms,” Municipal Securities Rule Making Board, accessed March 
23, 2016, http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/REFUNDING.aspx. 
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Rating Services, the largest rating agency of Texas MUD bonds, places emphasis on a 
district’s relative level of development and financial stability, as evidenced by the 
maintenance of strong financial reserves over several years.25 26 
 Although a MUD must pay a fee in order to be rated, a high quality bond rating 
means that the district will realize lower interest costs when issuing debt. Furthermore, 
some financially mature MUDs may qualify for municipal bond insurance on the debt 
they issue, which means the bonds will carry an even higher credit rating resulting in 
lower interest costs. 
TCEQ Economic Feasibility Rules 
Before a MUD can issue bonds, certain regulatory requirements and state 
mandated economic feasibility rules must be met. The TCEQ must determine the 
economic feasibility of a bond issue using certain “feasibility rules.” The MUD, through 
its consultants, must be able to demonstrate that its bonds are economically feasible based 
upon its tax rate and property values. According to the TCEQ, economic feasibility is the 
determination of whether the land values, existing improvements, and projected 
improvements in the MUD will be sufficient to support a reasonable tax rate for debt 
service obligations on existing and proposed bond issues while maintaining competitive 
utility rates.27 28 
                                                 
25 Horacio G. Aldrete-Sanchez, James M. Breeding, Theodore A. Chapman and Colleen Woodell, 
“Methodology and Assumptions: Rating Unlimited Property Tax Basic Infrastructure Districts,” Standard 
& Poor’s RatingsDirect (report, 2009), 2. 
26 See Appendix 3 for credit characteristics for each credit rating and rating distributions of Texas MUDs. 
27 30 Texas Administrative Code, §293.59 
28 See Appendix 4 for a history of MUD tax rates. 
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The first and primary economic feasibility rule is based on the district’s tax rate. 
A MUD must demonstrate to the TCEQ that the bond issue can be paid by certain 
“growth” and “no-growth” tax rates. That is, the financial advisor for the district, who 
acts as the investment banker in structuring the bond transaction on behalf of the district, 
models a “growth” tax rate to assume a reasonable increase in assessed valuation in the 
district resulting from the construction of new homes on already developed lots. The “no 
growth” tax rate scenario assumes no new homes will be constructed in the MUD. The 
TCEQ rules allow the maximum combined growth tax rate to be $1.50 per $100 of 
assessed valuation and the maximum combined no-growth tax rate to be $2.50 per $100 
of assessed valuation.29 
The next key economic feasibility rules are based on completed construction of 
homes and utilities. At least 25% of the projected value of houses shown in the projected 
“growth” tax rate calculations must be completed prior to the sale of the bonds. 
Furthermore, in order to obtain TCEQ approval for a proposed bond issue the following 
conditions must be met with regard to completed utilities: 
1. All permits for groundwater, surface water, waste discharge, or capacity 
needed to support the projected build-out must have been obtained; 
2. All underground water, wastewater, and drainage facilities to be financed 
by the bonds or necessary to serve the projected build-out to support 
feasibility must be at least 95% complete; 
                                                 
29 See Appendix 5 for an example of “growth” and “no growth” debt service cash flow models submitted 
with a TCEQ bond application, as well as a schedule reflecting how the “growth” scenario arrives at the 
assessed valuation figures it uses. 
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3. Sufficient lift station, water plant, and sewage treatment plant capacity to 
serve the connections projected for a period of not less than 18 months 
shall be either 95% complete or available in existing plants; 
4. Water supply, lift station, and wastewater treatment capacity needed to 
support the projected build-out used to support feasibility must be existing 
or funded by the bond issue; and 
5. All street and road construction to provide access to the areas provided 
with utilities financed by the bonds or necessary to serve the projected 
build-out to support feasibility must be 95% complete. 
Other economic feasibility requirements include a developer’s requirement to 
permanently waive their right to claim agricultural, open space, timberland, or 
inventory valuation for any land, homes, or buildings it owns in the MUD. Also, a 
current market study must address the projected building program for three years 
subsequent to bond application and the period of projected build-out shown in the 
bond application and competing projects in the surrounding market area. 
The 30 Percent Rule 
 The TCEQ promulgated regulations in 1974 that required developers to assume 
30% of construction costs for certain water, sewer, and drainage facilities. Under this 
rule, developers cannot be reimbursed from bond proceeds for more than 70% of the 
construction and engineering costs of certain facilities.30 However, some facilities, such 
                                                 
30 Association of Water Board Directors, “Water District Directors’ Handbook”, 54. 
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as wastewater treatment plants and water supply, treatment, and storage facilities, are 
exempt from this rule. 
 Districts may obtain a waiver of the 30% rule from the TCEQ if it meets one of 
the following criteria: 
1. Has a ratio of debt to certified assessed valuation of 10% or less; 
2. Obtains an investment grade credit rating (BBB- or higher) on its 
proposed bond issue; or 
3. Obtains a credit enhanced rating on its proposed bond issue by obtaining 
municipal bond insurance.31 
Effects of the Financial Crisis of 2008 
 The financial crises of 2008 was marked by a bust in the housing market on a 
national scale. While the impacts of this bust were far less evident in Texas than in other 
states, there were still implications realized by the municipal bond market in Texas. First, 
the rate of issuance of new money bonds and of new development projects slowed 
tremendously. Initially, yields on Houston area MUD bonds spiked, as the financial 
markets viewed a credit tied to development and the housing market as being a riskier 
security. As interest rates decreased, however, MUDs began issuing more refunding 
bonds in order to retire outstanding callable debt at lower interest costs.32 While the 
financial crisis put a strain on the Houston housing market and broader local economy, it 
was an example of how the TCEQ’s feasibility rules for development were advantageous 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 See Appendix 6 for a history of refunding bonds issued by Houston-area MUDs. 
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in deterring, and even preventing, defaults. Thus, it is important to note that no major 
changes in law or regulation surrounding MUDs came as a result of the financial crisis. 
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Chapter 2: Benefits and Liabilities of MUDs 
MUDs have been viewed as a highly effective development tool in Texas because 
they benefit all of the represented interests, including the bond investors, the developers, 
the consumers, and good public policy. Each of these benefits will be discussed in the 
subsections below. Those opposed to the use of MUDs have concerns surrounding 
powers of the developer throughout the governance process, lack of checks from the 
public, and other transparency issues. 
Benefits to Bond Markets 
Between 2001 and 2008, Houston area MUDs issued approximately $6 billion in 
bonds in at least 1,281 issues and approximately 60% of the bonds issued were insured 
with a AAA rating and carried an average true interest cost of approximately 4.53%, 30% 
were insured with a AA rating and carried an average true interest cost of 5.03%, and the 
remaining bonds were non-rated and carried an average true interest cost of less than 
5.5%.33 There are several reasons why there has been a developed investor confidence in, 
and a ready market for, debt issued by Texas MUDs. Those reasons are as follows: 
1. The regulatory requirements imposed on Texas MUD bond issues; 
2. A MUDs ability to impose an unlimited ad valorem tax to support debt 
service payments on its bonds; 
3. The debt service payment history of Texas MUDs, in general; and 
4. Investor experience with Texas MUD bonds over the last thirty years. 
                                                 
33 Allen and Oliver, “Municipal Utility Districts in Texas”, 7. 
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While there are no constitutional or statutory limits on the amount of bonds that a 
MUD may issue, a MUD must satisfy strict feasibility rules issued by the TCEQ. Before 
a MUD can issue any debt the TCEQ rules require the following: 
1. The completion of all water, sewer, and drainage facilities to be financed 
with the proposed bond issue; 
2. The completion of all streets and roads that provide access to the areas 
served by the utility improvements; 
3. The completion of at least 25% of the projected value of houses, buildings, 
and/or other improvements shown in the projected tax rate calculations 
used to support the bonds; and 
4. A showing that the land values, existing improvements, and projected 
improvements will be sufficient to support a reasonable tax rate for debt 
service payments for existing and proposed debt while maintaining 
competitive utility rates.34 
While these standards are a legalized disclosure of risks, they are also designed to protect 
the consumer against high tax rates and maintain the integrity of MUD bonds, which will 
allow taxpayers to realize better interest rates for future MUD projects. 
As previously mentioned, while the TCEQ may limit the amount of debt issued by 
a MUD, the MUD itself is authorized to levy an unlimited ad valorem tax against all 
property in the MUD in order to support debt service payments. Furthermore, MUDs fall 
at the top of the “capital stack,” as a MUD’s tax lien has first priority over mortgages and 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 4. 
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assessments, and has the same priority as county, city, and school district taxes.35 This 
priority in the capital stack is significant when considered with the fact that only in 
extreme situations will a borrower or mortgage lender who has foreclosed forfeit property 
in order to satisfy taxes due on the property. 
Other key forms of security for investors that exist in the Texas MUD bond 
market are the fact that the interest payments made by a MUD to a purchaser of its bonds 
are exempt from federal income taxation. Until 2008, the net yield on unrated Texas 
MUD bonds equaled approximately the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury Bonds.36 
Benefits to Developers 
MUD financing of water, sewer, drainage, and other public infrastructure projects 
allows the developer to quickly recover infrastructure costs that otherwise would be 
recouped by raising the selling price of subdivided units (i.e. higher costs passed down to 
the home buyer/consumer). In a business that demands liquidity and is driven by a 
project’s internal rate of return, this is an important element in allowing housing supply 
to quickly match market demand. 
During the first phase of a typical 500 acre development using a MUD, the 
developer is responsible for financing the build-out of infrastructure for the first 100 
acres. Once construction of the first phase is complete and the TCEQ feasibility standards 
have been met, the MUD issues bonds to pay for the constructed infrastructure and 
reimburses the developer with the bond proceeds. The MUD levies an ad valorem tax on 
all taxable land, houses, and other improvements within the boundaries of the district to 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 See Appendix 7 for a yield comparison of Texas MUD bonds versus other debt securities. 
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support the bond issue. Once the developer receives reimbursement from bond proceeds 
for the first phase, the funds are then used to construct the build out of the second phase 
of development. This pattern will continue until the development project has been 
entirely built-out. 
MUD financing of utility improvements also allows developer capital to be 
redeployed at a faster rate and far less expensively than other methods, resulting in a 
higher quality development over a shorter development period.37 The cyclical 
reimbursement feature of a MUD, as previously described, also lowers the barriers to 
entry for developers by reducing the amount of required capital necessary to begin 
development of new communities. This, in turn, allows for a more competitive housing 
market and puts downward pressure on prices for homebuyers.38 
Those developers choosing non-MUD financing typically subject themselves to 
higher private interest rates and longer reimbursement periods. This is due to the fact that 
private developers are not able to compete with a credit rating held by a public entity with 
unlimited tax authority.39 Therefore, if a developer privately finances infrastructure costs, 
the cost of the subdivided units will be inflated by the pro rata cost of the utility system 
and extra capital costs (i.e. borrowing costs).40 This results in significantly higher lot 
prices and higher housing costs, which creates a more challenging marketing 
environment for the developer. Finally, private financing can slow the rate of 
                                                 
37 Allen and Oliver, “Municipal Utility Districts in Texas”, 5. 
38 See Appendix 8 for comparative statistics on the Houston housing market versus that of other 
municipalities without special districts. 
39 See Appendix 9 for credit rating information by issuance of Texas MUDs. 
40 Allen and Oliver, “Municipal Utility Districts in Texas”, 5. 
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development due to traditional lenders not being willing to finance a new development 
phase until loans issued to finance the prior phase have been fully repaid. 
Benefits to Consumers 
 Ultimately, the costs of all the utility systems owned and operated by the MUD 
are paid by the consumer. As previously mentioned, the use of MUDs allows the cost of 
site improvements to be paid for through public financing, which lowers the lot costs and 
reduces the price of homes. Historically, the tax-exempt interest rates on bonds issued by 
MUDs are lower than mortgage rates. Additionally, payments of taxes to the MUD by the 
homeowner are viewed as eligible for deduction from the homeowner’s federal income 
tax. Therefore, the homebuyer’s tax payments to the MUD are significantly lower than if 
the cost of improvements were included in the purchase price of the home. 
 Consumers also have the benefit of transparency in taxes levied by a MUD. 
Sellers are required to have purchasers of land and houses within the MUD execute a 
“Notice to Purchaser” informing purchasers of the existence of the MUD, its tax rate, and 
the amount of authorized bonds.41 MUDs are also required to file that same information 
in the real property records. 
Other Benefits 
 The special district model in Texas and the use of MUDs for financing public 
infrastructure projects represents sound public policy. Several good public policy goals 
are achieved through the use of MUDs, including the development of quality 
infrastructure and the creation of affordable housing by encouraging a competitive 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
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market for developers. More importantly, MUDs represent a governmental entity whose 
directors are elected by MUD residents to provide for the long term management and 
financing of a community’s infrastructure needs. 
Liabilities of MUDs 
Some argue that special districts, and MUDs more specifically, present many 
liabilities that the public should be aware of and that the governments who authorized them 
should consider. These liabilities and pitfalls include lack of transparency, lack of public 
participation, unchecked power, and encouragement of rapid growth and poor city 
planning. 
Special districts have a broad range of powers and responsibilities authorized by 
state legislatures and encouraged by units of general purpose local governments in order to 
deal with tough public policy problems. Since World War II, there has been a threefold 
increase in special districts and, in total, special districts receive approximately $123 billion 
in revenue and have $217 billion in public debt.42 Though special districts have grown in 
number and scope, many argue that the theories that support them have not been adequately 
scrutinized by the governments authorizing them because of the difficulty in developing a 
metric for assessment.  
Since developers receive most of the benefits from a MUD, they have tended to be 
their most vocal advocates. That is, most of the proceeds from the initial bond issuances 
by a MUD are used to repay a developer at a lower borrowing cost not incurred by the 
developer, but by the taxpayers. Without the bonding and taxing powers, MUDs would not 
be able to provide a wide range of amenities, and developers would not be able to benefit 
from the construction of infrastructure at low or no cost to them.43 For these reasons, some 
                                                 
42 Sara C. Galvan, “Wrestling with MUDs To Pin Down the Truth About Special Districts,” 75 Fordham 
Law Review (2007), 3044. 
43 Ibid., 3048. 
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argue that MUDs therefore make suburban development less risky and more attractive by 
distributing public funds to subsidize private developers’ efforts.44 Furthermore, since 
MUDs enable a nimble public vehicle for development and that they represent a model of 
relatively decentralized city planning, they encourage urban sprawl and worsen the 
problems associated with it, such as increased traffic, environmental damage, and similar 
issues. 
Developers also wield a lot of power at the onset and throughout the existence of a 
MUD. Whether lobbying the legislature or regulators to create their MUDs, the developer 
is the primary driver behind the creation of a MUD. The developer also hires the district’s 
bond counsel, appoints the initial board of directors, and oversees construction within the 
district.45 This creates a situation where the decision makers for the district are loyal and 
responsive to the developer, thereby removing power from the general public and putting 
it in the hands of Texas real estate developers. 
Arguments also exist that, in the long run, MUDs also suffer from a public 
participation deficit. Smaller units of government typically encourage greater citizen 
participation. The same could be said for a MUD, but because of the fact that too many 
other overlapping special districts also exist within the boundaries of a given MUD, people 
are not necessarily able to “vote with their feet.”46 This is due to the complexity and 
uncertainty of what special districts exist and what their powers are as perceived by the 
general public. Additionally, though the developer’s initial board of directors may be 
replaced over time, few people are engaged with the affairs of a MUD.47 
 
  
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 3049. 
46 Ibid., 3045. 
47 Ibid., 3049. 
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Chapter 3: Case Study 
 As in any market-based environment, there are inherent risks involved. The 
developer, issuer, bondholders, and other market participants are all subjected to these 
risks in varying forms. This chapter of the report will seek to point out where some of the 
weaknesses and risks in the special district model have been in the past and how those 
weaknesses have been mitigated. The primary means of achieving this will be through a 
specific case of a MUD defaulting on its debt and the contributing factors that lead to that 
event. 
Harris County MUD 19 
In 1982, Harris County MUD 19 (MUD 19) issued a series of bonds totaling $2.6 
million. Approximately five years later, MUD 19 found itself defaulting on their 
outstanding debt obligations and seeking Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection. When MUD 
19 issued its bonds in 1982, it was generally accepted that debt securities issued by Harris 
County MUDs were a good investment even though they were categorized in the riskiest 
class of municipal debt (i.e. unrated bonds). Up to this point, no Harris County MUD had 
ever defaulted and investors were confident of receiving their tax-free interest and that 
their principal investment was “safe.”48 
At the time, initial homeowners in MUD 19 quickly realized the inherent risk they 
assumed when buying a house in a newly created MUD. That is, as a homeowner in a 
MUD, a resident assumes a pro rata share of that district’s outstanding debt obligations 
according to the value of the homeowner’s taxable real and personal property relative to 
                                                 
48 Dr. Ronald Welch, “Trouble on Tap for Municipal Utility Districts,” Houston Chronicle, May 17, 1987. 
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the value of all other property.49 As previously mentioned in this report, given the total 
assessed valuation within the district, the MUD will then set a tax rate that is able to 
support the required debt service on its bonds. For about two years after a series of MUD 
bonds are issued, the tax rate required to make the debt service payments on that issue 
will be relatively low as two years of interest payments are placed into the district’s debt 
service fund from the proceeds of the bond sale.50 This is referred to as capitalized 
interest. 
During that same time period, the developer will sell residential lots and 
commercial tracts, and new homes and commercial improvements will be constructed 
that will increase the MUD’s property tax base. However, whenever the growth rate of 
construction is slower than initially projected, it may be necessary for the district to 
increase its tax rate.51 This is exactly what happened in MUD 19 and, as a result, the tax 
rate in MUD 19 increased by a factor of approximately 500% from $1.35 per $100 of 
assessed valuation in 1984 to $6.85 per $100 of assessed valuation in 1985.52 In real 
dollars, this means that the average homeowner in the district with a house assessed at 
$80,000 saw their MUD tax bill go from $1,080 per year when the Series 1982 bonds 
were issued to $5,480 per year in 1985. This tax rate would have only continued to climb 
had MUD 19 not filed for bankruptcy the subsequent year. 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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Contribution Factors 
 When MUD 19 issued its Series 1982 bonds, the district’s developer rendered his 
land and lot values so that, in conjunction with projected annual house sales, they would 
generate the required $430,000 average annual debt service. However, these bonds were 
issued during a time when the Houston real estate market was in a depressed environment 
and the developer did not incorporate this factor into the required cash flow analyses 
submitted as part of the bond application to the Texas Water Commission (TCEQ’s 
predecessor). The Texas Water Commission ultimately approved the sale of the bonds 
even though the staff comments on the bond application expressed their disapproval of 
the projections of lot, house, and land sales as being too aggressive. 
 Another contributing factor to MUD 19’s default is the difference between how 
ad valorem taxes were assessed then versus now. Prior to the phase-in of the Harris 
County Central Appraisal District, each municipality and special purpose district had its 
own tax-assessor collector and, as such, the appraised values for all the overlapping 
jurisdictions could vary greatly.53 Under this model, developers rendered their holdings at 
higher values to MUD assessors/collectors than to other taxing jurisdictions, so the 
marginal cost to the developer of an increase in MUD property taxes was justified to keep 
the MUD property tax competitively low.54 In other words, the developer reported high 
assessed valuations on his property because it allowed him to achieve a lower tax rate for 
the MUD in order to service the MUD’s debt. The lower tax rate was more attractive to 
home builders because they would be able to more effectively market homes to 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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homebuyers due to the lower tax rate. More importantly, however, by reporting higher 
appraised values on his holdings, the developer qualified for more MUD reimbursement 
sooner rather than later because he was able to satisfy the 10% debt ratio required in 
order to be exempt from the TCEQ’s 30 Percent Rule. Under the current model, if the 
developer renders his property to one overlapping jurisdiction then, through the central 
appraisal district, that rendition will apply to all overlapping jurisdictions.55 
Implications 
 The implications of MUD 19’s default were many. By 1992, fiscal stresses in the 
Texas economy lead to more defaults. Specifically, 17 MUDs and one Levee 
Improvement District defaulted on their debt service payments, which totaled $64.6 
million in defaults. Stated alternatively, these figures represented, at the time, 5.8% of 
active districts and 2.9% of outstanding debt. The effects on the general public were an 
increase in cost of debt and the associated property taxes or user fees paid to finance 
urban infrastructure. Furthermore, the default sent signals to homebuyers that they should 
be cautious of purchasing a home that resides within a MUD or that they should only 
locate within a MUD that has a large and diversified tax base or has a developer with a 
good reputation and enough cash to weather depressed real estate environments.56 
 MUD 19’s default also encouraged changes in state law and regulation. Most 
notably it contributed to the establishment of the economic feasibility requirements, 
detailed previously in this report, that are enforced by the TCEQ in order for a MUD to 
have a bond issuance approved. Additionally, the way in which taxes were assessed and 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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collected changed so that all tax-assessors collectors were coordinating with a county’s 
central appraisal district to avoid situations where overlapping jurisdictions had varying 
assessed valuations. 
 Other policies that were implemented included restrictions on developers from 
filing for agriculture, timber, wildlife, or other ad valorem exemptions. These defaults 
also prompted the TCEQ rule that requires at least 25% of the projected value of houses 
shown in the tax rate calculations to be completed prior to the sale of bonds. Developers 
were also incentivized with an exemption from the 30% rule (detailed previously in this 
report) if they could obtain a debt to certified assessed valuation ratio of 10% or less. 
 The default also disrupted the capital markets surrounding Texas MUD bonds. 
Demand for Texas MUD bonds decreased significantly as there was a scare that MUD 
19’s default would have a ripple effect across all Harris County MUDs due to damaged 
credit ratings and, by extension, higher interest costs on debt. This meant that 
bondholders were required to sell MUD bonds at a premium if they wanted to shed them 
from their investment portfolio, even if the bonds were from mature issuers with strong 
financial statements. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions 
 The case for the special district model in Texas, and MUDs more specifically, is 
strong. Currently, Texas MUDs are in the best financial condition that they have ever 
been in. This is due to the policies that have been implemented, as previously outlined in 
this report, aimed at protecting the taxpayer and ensuring sound financial footing before 
public debt is issued. This is also attributable to the prudent management that MUDs 
have through their private professional consultants. Also, MUDs are in better fiscal 
condition and have stronger financial statements than all other comparable public entities. 
In part, this is due to the fact that MUDs have no employees, benefits, pensions, or health 
care costs. 
 MUDs have also proven to be far more nimble than larger governments, which 
allows developers to respond to housing market demands in a much timelier manner. This 
flexibility also allows the taxpayer to save money, as MUDs are able to issue refunding 
bonds when and if interest rates go below that of a previous bond issue with a call option. 
MUD financing of utility improvements also allows a developer to redeploy capital at a 
faster rate and far less expensively than other methods. This results in higher quality 
development projects over a shorter development period. Furthermore, the cyclical 
reimbursement feature of a MUD lowers barriers to entry for developers by reducing the 
amount of required capital necessary to begin development of new communities, which 
creates a more competitive housing market. These savings, both through lower interest 
costs and competitive market conditions, are ultimately realized by the end consumer. 
 The structure of MUDs also offer recognizable benefits to homeowners and the 
broader public. That is, the structure of MUDs is such that only those that use and benefit 
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from the utilities pay for the services. This attribute prevents taxpayers from outside of 
the jurisdiction from having to subsidize public infrastructure and systems that they are 
not using. Additionally, MUDs are structured so that the public sector is forgoing risks 
associated with land development. 
 The risks and market failures outlined in the previous section should now be of 
minimal concern to interested parties, as they have been largely mitigated through 
changes in public policy and market self-regulation. Issuers, underwriters, investors, and 
homeowners now have a far greater sense of security in the credit quality of the debt 
instruments being issued by MUDs, which is reflected in the current market demand for 
these tax-exempt securities.  
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Appendix 1: Types of Special Districts 
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Appendix 2: Legislative Timeline of Special Districts 
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Source: Allen Boone Humphries Robinson LLP 
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Appendix 3: Credit Characteristics and Rating Distributions of Texas MUDs 
 
Source: Standard & Poor’s Rating Services 
 
Source: Standard & Poor’s Rating Services  
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Appendix 4: History of MUD Tax Rates 
 
 
Source: Municipal Information Services 
Note: The dollar amount in the y-axis is per $100 of assessed value. 
Note: The “Weighted Average” line represents the average tax rate weighted by the 
taxable value of each MUD. It is derived by multiplying each MUD’s taxable value by its 
tax rate, adding each of those products, dividing that aggregate sum by the sum of the 
taxable values of all the MUDs. 
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Appendix 5: Examples of Assumed “Growth” and “No-Growth” in Assessed Valuation for TCEQ Bond Application 
 
Previous Yr. Projected Total Funds Projected
Beginning Interest Assessed Tax Coll. Tax Other Available for Debt Service Ending Reserve
Year Balance(A) Earnings(B) Valuation(C) Rate(T) Factor Revenues Sources(D) Debt Service Reqmnts(E) Balance Balance
2016 $1,730,000 $4,325 $305,620,886 $0.56 98% $1,677,247 $0 $3,411,572 $1,865,539 $1,546,033 74%
2017 $1,546,033 $3,865 $331,475,789 $0.56 98% $1,819,139 $0 $3,369,038 $2,078,142 $1,290,896 61%
2018 $1,290,896 $3,227 $341,975,789 $0.56 98% $1,876,763 $0 $3,170,886 $2,132,392 $1,038,494 48%
2019 $1,038,494 $2,596 $355,795,789 $0.56 98% $1,952,607 $0 $2,993,698 $2,160,704 $832,994 34%
2020 $832,994 $2,082 $365,595,789 $0.65 98% $2,328,845 $0 $3,163,921 $2,477,879 $686,042 27%
2021 $686,042 $1,715 $366,595,789 $0.70 98% $2,514,847 $0 $3,202,604 $2,497,917 $704,687 28%
2022 $704,687 $1,762 $366,595,789 $0.70 98% $2,514,847 $0 $3,221,296 $2,491,535 $729,761 29%
2023 $729,761 $1,824 $366,595,789 $0.70 98% $2,514,847 $0 $3,246,433 $2,528,223 $718,210 28%
2024 $718,210 $1,796 $366,595,789 $0.70 98% $2,514,847 $0 $3,234,852 $2,527,617 $707,235 27%
2025 $707,235 $1,768 $366,595,789 $0.70 98% $2,514,847 $0 $3,223,851 $2,577,220 $646,631 25%
2026 $646,631 $1,617 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $3,270,873 $2,566,467 $704,406 27%
2027 $704,406 $1,761 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $3,328,794 $2,569,129 $759,665 29%
2028 $759,665 $1,899 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $3,384,190 $2,583,726 $800,464 31%
2029 $800,464 $2,001 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $3,425,092 $2,579,913 $845,179 32%
2030 $845,179 $2,113 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $3,469,918 $2,607,729 $862,189 32%
2031 $862,189 $2,155 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $3,486,971 $2,656,514 $830,457 31%
2032 $830,457 $2,076 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $3,455,159 $2,645,679 $809,480 30%
2033 $809,480 $2,024 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $3,434,130 $2,664,960 $769,170 44%
2034 $769,170 $1,923 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $3,393,719 $1,729,089 $1,664,630 94%
2035 $1,664,630 $4,162 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $4,291,418 $1,764,098 $2,527,320 188%
2036 $2,527,320 $6,318 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $5,156,265 $1,343,930 $3,812,335 279%
2037 $3,812,335 $9,531 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $6,444,492 $1,364,061 $5,080,431 368%
2038 $5,080,431 $12,701 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $7,715,758 $1,381,436 $6,334,322 469%
2039 $6,334,322 $15,836 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $8,972,784 $1,351,455 $7,621,329 918%
2040 $7,621,329 $19,053 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $10,263,009 $829,905 $9,433,104 1161%
2041 $9,433,104 $23,583 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $12,079,313 $812,280 $11,267,033 1410%
2042 $11,267,033 $28,168 $366,595,789 $0.73 98% $2,622,626 $0 $13,917,827 $799,187 $13,118,640 #DIV/0!
Prepared Post Series 2016 Bond Sale - Actual Results
HARRIS COUNTY MUD No. ___  -  AV GROWTH DEBT SERVICE CASH FLOW 
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Previous Yr. Projected Total Funds Projected
Beginning Interest Assessed Tax Coll. Tax Other Available for Debt Service Ending Reserve
Year Balance(A) Earnings(B) Valuation(C) Rate(T) Factor Revenues Sources(D) Debt Service Reqmnts(E) Balance Balance
2016 $1,730,000 $4,325 $305,620,886 $0.56 98% $1,677,247 $0 $3,411,572 $1,865,539 $1,546,033 74%
2017 $1,546,033 $3,865 $331,475,789 $0.56 98% $1,819,139 $0 $3,369,038 $2,078,142 $1,290,896 61%
2018 $1,290,896 $3,227 $331,475,789 $0.56 98% $1,819,139 $0 $3,113,262 $2,132,392 $980,870 45%
2019 $980,870 $2,452 $331,475,789 $0.64 98% $2,079,016 $0 $3,062,338 $2,160,704 $901,634 36%
2020 $901,634 $2,254 $331,475,789 $0.82 98% $2,663,739 $0 $3,567,628 $2,477,879 $1,089,749 44%
2021 $1,089,749 $2,724 $331,475,789 $0.82 98% $2,663,739 $0 $3,756,213 $2,497,917 $1,258,296 51%
2022 $1,258,296 $3,146 $331,475,789 $0.82 98% $2,663,739 $0 $3,925,181 $2,491,535 $1,433,646 57%
2023 $1,433,646 $3,584 $331,475,789 $0.82 98% $2,663,739 $0 $4,100,969 $2,528,223 $1,572,746 62%
2024 $1,572,746 $3,932 $331,475,789 $0.82 98% $2,663,739 $0 $4,240,418 $2,527,617 $1,712,801 66%
2025 $1,712,801 $4,282 $331,475,789 $0.82 98% $2,663,739 $0 $4,380,822 $2,577,220 $1,803,602 70%
2026 $1,803,602 $4,509 $331,475,789 $0.82 98% $2,663,739 $0 $4,471,851 $2,566,467 $1,905,384 74%
2027 $1,905,384 $4,763 $331,475,789 $0.83 98% $2,696,224 $0 $4,606,371 $2,569,129 $2,037,242 79%
2028 $2,037,242 $5,093 $331,475,789 $0.83 98% $2,696,224 $0 $4,738,559 $2,583,726 $2,154,833 84%
2029 $2,154,833 $5,387 $331,475,789 $0.83 98% $2,696,224 $0 $4,856,444 $2,579,913 $2,276,531 87%
2030 $2,276,531 $5,691 $331,475,789 $0.83 98% $2,696,224 $0 $4,978,447 $2,607,729 $2,370,718 89%
2031 $2,370,718 $5,927 $331,475,789 $0.83 98% $2,696,224 $0 $5,072,869 $2,656,514 $2,416,355 91%
2032 $2,416,355 $6,041 $331,475,789 $0.83 98% $2,696,224 $0 $5,118,620 $2,645,679 $2,472,941 93%
2033 $2,472,941 $6,182 $331,475,789 $0.83 98% $2,696,224 $0 $5,175,347 $2,664,960 $2,510,387 145%
2034 $2,510,387 $6,276 $331,475,789 $0.80 98% $2,598,770 $0 $5,115,433 $1,729,089 $3,386,344 192%
2035 $3,386,344 $8,466 $331,475,789 $0.80 98% $2,598,770 $0 $5,993,580 $1,764,098 $4,229,482 315%
2036 $4,229,482 $10,574 $331,475,789 $0.80 98% $2,598,770 $0 $6,838,826 $1,343,930 $5,494,896 403%
2037 $5,494,896 $13,737 $331,475,789 $0.80 98% $2,598,770 $0 $8,107,404 $1,364,061 $6,743,343 488%
2038 $6,743,343 $16,858 $331,475,789 $0.80 98% $2,598,770 $0 $9,358,971 $1,381,436 $7,977,535 590%
2039 $7,977,535 $19,944 $331,475,789 $0.80 98% $2,598,770 $0 $10,596,249 $1,351,455 $9,244,794 1114%
2040 $9,244,794 $23,112 $331,475,789 $0.80 98% $2,598,770 $0 $11,866,676 $829,905 $11,036,771 1359%
2041 $11,036,771 $27,592 $331,475,789 $0.80 98% $2,598,770 $0 $13,663,133 $812,280 $12,850,853 1608%
2042 $12,850,853 $32,127 $331,475,789 $0.80 98% $2,598,770 $0 $15,481,751 $799,187 $14,682,564 #DIV/0!
Prepared Post Series 2016 Bond Sale - Actual Results
HARRIS COUNTY MUD No. ___  -  NO GROWTH DEBT SERVICE CASH FLOW 
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$305,620,886 1/1/2015 Certified Taxble Value
$331,475,789 1/1/2016 Projected Assessed Valuation
$9,000,000 Plus 45 Homes @ $200,000   (additonal house value only)                  
$1,500,000 Plus Build out of 2 Commercial Acres @ $750,000 per Acre
$341,975,789 1/1/2017 Projected Assessed Valuation
$3,520,000 Plus 88 Lots @ $40,000 per lot
$8,800,000 Plus 44 Homes @ $200,000 (additional house value only)                
$1,500,000 Plus 2 Commercial Acres @ $750,000 per Acre
$355,795,789 1/1/2018 Projected Assessed Valuation
$8,800,000 Plus 44 Homes @$200,000 (additional house value only)
$1,000,000 Plus 1 Industrial Project @ $1,000,000
$365,595,789 1/1/2019 Projected Assessed Valuation
$1,000,000 Plus 1 Industrial Project @ $1,000,000
$366,595,789 1/1/2020 Projected Assessed Valuation
HARRIS COUNTY  MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT No. ___
ASSESSED VALUATION PROJECTIONS BASED ON HCAD'S 1/1/2016 ESTIMATE OF VALUE DATA
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Appendix 6: Houston Area Refunding Bonds Issued 
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Appendix 7: Comparative Yields for Texas MUD Bonds 
 
Source: Municipal Information Services 
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Appendix 8: Comparative Housing Market Statistics 
 
Source: Municipal Information Services  
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Appendix 9: Quality of Debt Issued by Texas MUDs (1989-2014) 
 
Source: Municipal Information Services 
  
$Amount
Number Issued
of Issues Rating Type (million)
955 Not Rated $3,251.67
2,141 Insured AAA* $10,378.98
484 Insured AA** $2,205.93
321 Misc Ratings $1,431.82
3,901 $17,268.39
Rating Type in $Amount
Number Ascending Order Issued
of Issues of Quality (million)
4 Rated Ba $16.94
21 Rated Baa $42.69
68 Rated BBB- Baa3 $300.60
57 Rated BBB Baa2 $247.61
37 Rated BBB+  Baa1 $135.77
30 Rated A- A3 $143.54
41 Rated A A2 $150.25
30 Rated A+ A1 $147.53
26 Rated AA- Aa3 $209.01
4 Rated AA+ $28.48
3 Rated Aa $9.43
321 $1,431.82
Miscellaneous Ratings
Number of Issues
$Amount Issued
25%
55%
12%
8%
Not Rated Insured AAA*
Insured AA** Misc Ratings
19%
60%
13%
8%
Not Rated Insured AAA*
Insured AA** Misc Ratings
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